feat(saas): enforce strict response policy

req: security/006

req: operations/006

req: operations/008
This commit is contained in:
slhx agent
2026-07-14 00:59:06 +02:00
parent 4fc5e53adf
commit 6f58453aae
5 changed files with 47 additions and 10 deletions
+5 -5
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@@ -59,19 +59,19 @@ encryption, retention, backup, and deployment policy remain host concerns.
## Slice 6 — production integration reference
- [ ] **User value:** adopters can copy a proven boundary for durable storage, auth, transactions, security controls, observability, and restart recovery without hemx owning vendor policy.
- **State:** In progress — the requirements audit corrected stale namespace aliases and found one missing production-reference control: stable request/session/user correlation. The mutation now returns a generated request ID and emits typed request/session/user diagnostic correlation without accepting caller-controlled identifiers or secrets.
- [x] **User value:** adopters can copy a proven boundary for durable storage, auth, transactions, security controls, observability, and restart recovery without hemx owning vendor policy.
- **State:** Complete — the corrected audit found and closed two production-reference gaps: stable request/session/user correlation and strict deployable response policy. The app returns generated request IDs, emits typed secret-free correlation, and applies a no-inline/no-eval CSP plus nosniff and referrer policy to every response.
- **Build:** evolve one existing reference app using ordinary integration adapters; add durable app storage, authenticated/authorized allowed and denied mutations, CSRF/origin checks, transaction rollback, bounded input, structured failures, health/readiness, tracing/metrics hooks, and restart/deploy recovery.
- **Refusals:** no built-in database/auth provider, compliance claim, telemetry vendor, deployment system, or repository framework.
- **Requirements:** `security/001-009`, `operations/001-008`, `v1_release/003`, and the existing `auth/*`, `axum/*`, `failure/*`, and `diag/*` contracts (the former `adapter/*`, `integration/*`, and `diagnostics/*` cursor names do not exist in `REQUIREMENTS.md`).
- **Requirements:** `operations/001-008`, `security/003-004`, `security/006`, `security/009`, `v1_release/003`, and the applicable existing `auth/*` and `failure/004` contracts. The audit removed stale/nonexistent `adapter/*`, `integration/*`, and `diagnostics/*` aliases; `axum/*` and `diag/*` are adapter/editor contracts already owned by their focused slices, while the release-only advisory/license/unsafe-code audit in `security/008` remains a Slice 7 gate.
- **Proof:** end-to-end test survives process restart and mixed deployment, proves allowed/denied/rolled-back mutations and redacted diagnostics, and maps each framework-owned ASVS-relevant control to a failing/passing case.
`cargo test -p hemx-saas-example --test production_reference` proves current bearer authentication, origin/CSRF denial, bounded input, atomic durable commit, rollback, restart recovery, live-vs-ready dependency failure, redacted structured problem responses, aggregate metrics, stale-fingerprint rejection followed by current-build recovery, and generated request correlation on allowed, denied, mismatch, and failed mutations. The typed diagnostic hook carries only generated request ID, fixed session/user IDs, outcome, and duration, preventing request secrets from entering framework-owned records. Execution cursor: finish the corrected `security/*`, `operations/*`, `auth/*`, `axum/*`, `failure/*`, and `diag/*` citation audit; add only any remaining missing end-to-end control, then close Slice 6 if clean.
`cargo test -p hemx-saas-example --test production_reference` proves current bearer authentication, origin/CSRF denial, bounded input, strict CSP/security headers, atomic durable commit, rollback, restart recovery, live-vs-ready dependency failure, redacted structured problem responses, aggregate metrics, stale-fingerprint rejection followed by current-build recovery, and generated request correlation on allowed, denied, mismatch, and failed mutations. The typed diagnostic hook carries only generated request ID, fixed session/user IDs, outcome, and duration. Existing focused Kanban backpressure proof covers `operations/004`; the production-reference mismatch and restart proofs explicitly cover `operations/006` and `operations/008`. Slice 6 is complete.
## Slice 7 — v1 compatibility and closure
- [ ] **User value:** maintainers and adopters receive a reproducible, migration-aware v1 with no known material contradiction and no hidden publication side effect.
- **State:** Blocked by Slices 1-6 and explicit authority for any missing local audit tool installation.
- **State:** Active; Slices 1-6 are complete, and publishing remains separately authorized.
- **Build:** freeze the supported Rust/browser/WASM/integration matrix; reconcile public/generated/Surface/symbol/wire/runtime/persisted-schema compatibility; add migration fixtures; make canonical examples compatibility tests; update the progressive tutorial path; run all local release gates and disposition every P0/P1, advisory, unsafe-code, license, performance, accessibility, and documentation finding.
- **Refusals:** no publish, deploy, upload, store submission, speculative feature, or weakening a gate to make it pass.
- **Requirements:** `v1_release/001-010`, `versioning/*`, `test/*`, `diag/*`, `performance/*`, `security/008`, and all requirements changed by the preceding slices.
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@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ What it deliberately keeps out of the tutorial crate:
- provider credentials, external services, migrations, or browser automation
- billing, account administration, or other SaaS platform scope
Those production concerns belong in app adapters and recipes so the tutorial remains runnable in CI without external side effects.
Database encryption, backups, retention, incident policy, and identity-provider compliance remain host responsibilities; hemx does not claim them as framework controls. Those production concerns belong in app adapters and recipes so the tutorial remains runnable in CI without external side effects. req: security/009
Run:
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@@ -619,7 +619,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn mutation_diagnostics_are_structured_and_cannot_carry_request_secrets() {
// req: operations/003 req: operations/005 req: security/008
// req: operations/003 req: operations/005
let diagnostics = Arc::new(RecordingDiagnostics::default());
let ctx = AppContext::demo().with_diagnostic_sink(diagnostics.clone());
let request_id = ctx.next_request_id();
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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
use axum::body::Body;
use axum::extract::{DefaultBodyLimit, Form, Query, State};
use axum::extract::{DefaultBodyLimit, Form, Query, Request, State};
use axum::http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue, StatusCode};
use axum::middleware::{self, Next};
use axum::response::{IntoResponse, Response};
use axum::routing::{get, post};
use axum::Router;
@@ -38,9 +39,29 @@ fn app(ctx: AppContext) -> Router {
.route("/app.css", get(css))
.route("/metrics.js", get(metrics_js))
.layer(DefaultBodyLimit::max(8 * 1024))
.layer(middleware::from_fn(security_headers))
.with_state(ctx)
}
// req: security/006 req: security/009
async fn security_headers(request: Request, next: Next) -> Response {
let mut response = next.run(request).await;
let headers = response.headers_mut();
headers.insert(
"content-security-policy",
HeaderValue::from_static("default-src 'self'; script-src 'self'; style-src 'self'; img-src 'self' data:; connect-src 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'none'; frame-ancestors 'none'; form-action 'self'"),
);
headers.insert(
"x-content-type-options",
HeaderValue::from_static("nosniff"),
);
headers.insert(
"referrer-policy",
HeaderValue::from_static("strict-origin-when-cross-origin"),
);
response
}
async fn home(State(ctx): State<AppContext>) -> impl IntoResponse {
axum::response::Html(home_page(&ctx).into_string())
}
+18 -2
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@@ -102,13 +102,29 @@ fn ready_fingerprint(response: &str) -> &str {
#[test]
fn authenticated_project_mutation_is_atomic_and_survives_restart() {
// test req: auth/001 req: auth/002 req: auth/004 req: security/004 req: operations/001 req: v1_release/003
// test req: auth/001 req: auth/002 req: auth/004 req: security/004 req: security/006
// test req: security/009 req: operations/001 req: operations/006 req: v1_release/003
let address = available_address();
let origin = format!("http://{address}");
let store = test_path("durable");
{
let _app = start(&address, &store);
let home = request(&address, "GET", "/", &[], "");
let csp = response_header(&home, "content-security-policy");
assert!(csp.contains("default-src 'self'"), "{csp}");
assert!(csp.contains("script-src 'self'"), "{csp}");
assert!(csp.contains("object-src 'none'"), "{csp}");
assert!(csp.contains("form-action 'self'"), "{csp}");
assert!(!csp.contains("unsafe-inline"), "{csp}");
assert!(!csp.contains("unsafe-eval"), "{csp}");
assert_eq!(response_header(&home, "x-content-type-options"), "nosniff");
assert_eq!(
response_header(&home, "referrer-policy"),
"strict-origin-when-cross-origin"
);
assert!(!home.contains("<script>"));
assert!(!home.contains("javascript:"));
let live = request(&address, "GET", "/health/live", &[], "");
assert!(live.starts_with("HTTP/1.1 200"), "{live}");
assert!(live.contains("{\"status\":\"live\"}"), "{live}");
@@ -242,7 +258,7 @@ fn authenticated_project_mutation_is_atomic_and_survives_restart() {
#[test]
fn failed_durable_commit_rolls_back_visible_state() {
// test req: failure/004 req: operations/002 req: v1_release/003
// test req: failure/004 req: operations/002 req: operations/007 req: operations/008 req: v1_release/003
let address = available_address();
let origin = format!("http://{address}");
let store = test_path("rollback");